By Afi Yakubu

The President of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Dr. Mohammed ibn Chambas, on 20th November 2009 declared that the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Other Related Materials is in force and fully operational after the deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification by the Government of Benin.

The eight other countries that have so far ratified the convention and legitimized its enforcement in the sub-region are Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo .
The Convention seeks to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilizing impact of the accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW); strengthen the effort for the control of SALW; and to consolidate the gains of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons and Its Code of Conduct (31st October 1998 –14th June 2006).
Even though the Convention is now officially ratified and in force, the record of some of the countries (ratified or not) when it comes to respecting regional commitments does not indicate that they will guard the tenets of the Convention.

For instance Niger was the first to ratify the Convention and proudly announced it at the first ECOSAP conference in February 2007 in Accra. Around that time, the rebel group, Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) waged a low-level campaign against the government. Since then their attacks became bolder and by December 2007 more than 40 government troops had been killed. Certainly the source of the supply of weapons to the Nigerien rebels has remained active without permits or exemption certificates from ECOWAS as stipulated by the Convention.

In May 2009 a proposal for a referendum to extend the term of the President Mamadou Tandjah for three more years was floated. Expectedly, this campaign was met with resistance from the Constitutional Court and Parliament resulting in the President invoking his presidential emergency powers to dissolve the two institutions and unleashed the military into the streets. The referendum was consequently held on 4th August 2009 and the outcome was in favour of the President. Those in support of President Tandjah may argue that democratic process was aloud to take its full course but in the end a respectable population of Nigeriens felt short changed and abused because the President was the chef and the sole guest at the dinner table who danced well to the band that he paid to play his choice of tune. Not even the expulsion of Niger from ECOWAS or the withholding of the supplementary budget by European Commission could stop him from holding the referendum. This clearly demonstrates that President Tandjah and the rebels of Niger will only respect the Convention if they choose to.

Nigeria has ratified the Convention but there is no attempt so far to reduce the alleged one million small arms that is reported to be in the hands of militia groups in the Niger Delta. Recent threats by the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to pull out of peace negotiations is worrying because we know the effectiveness with which they can stand up against the government. Armed with weapons that can withstand the firepower of both the police and the military, the Niger Delta Militias are in a position to wreak havoc with the weapons that are already in their hands. Inter-religious conflict in the Jos area coupled with a partially managed presidential succession crises are some of the factors that could push up the demand for the small arms.

Now that the Convention is in force, it may be argued that states that violate it would be sanctioned according to the provisions of ECOWAS. However, the fact remains that sanctions have not been an effective way of bringing recalcitrant regimes to order. For instance, Security Council Resolution 1343 in March 2001 which was adopted to sanction Liberia consisted of a weapons embargo, measures against the export of its rough diamonds and travel restrictions on senior government members. In 2003 the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1478 and decided that the Government of Liberia had not fully complied with its demand to immediately cease support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region, as was stipulated in resolution 1343.

As to how effective the sanction was is up to us to judge.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1572, adopted to stop the import and supply of weapons to warring factions in Cote d’Ivoire also ended up as a paper tiger yielding more resolutions such as; 1539 (2004), 1609 ()2005, 1612 (2005), 1842 (2008) etc.

Guinea in September 2009 demonstrated clearly its readiness to use weapons against its people by employing state owned weapons to massacre about a hundred and sixty of its people. How will the Convention deal with a country that has not ratified it and displays such gross disrespect for its own internal laws, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the United Nations Charter.

Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau are counted among the countries with very active drug trafficking routes to the Western Europe and North America. Drugs and arms mutually enforce each other and can pose a grave danger to the sub- region when they are given the chance to flourish. How will a ratified Convention fare in Verde and Guinea Bissau? What kind of measures will deter offenders of the Convention in countries that stand ready to use small arms legally or illegally? What is the guarantee that we are still safe in West Africa?

Surprisingly Ghana, which is eulogized as a trailblazer of democracy in West Africa has still not ratified the Convention even though most of the civil society activism on the call for a small arms convention emanated from Ghana.

Ghana appears to be basking in a false glory of democratic achievements and playing down the importance of community safety and national security but in reality it is in a precarious situation.

Already Ghana is on the international radar as a major drug trafficking hob, a tag no nation should be proud of bearing. The oil find has placed a magnet on the country which attacks all manner of investors at such a rate that, there is no time to revise most of the laws to address the new safety and security challenges that come with transnational business opportunities both inland and offshore.

How deep can ECOWAS bite? Considering all the odds against the Convention and recalling several experiences of noncompliance of earlier protocols and agreements, ECOWAS may need more than persuasion to ensure transnational security across the sub region. West Africa is yet to put in place adequate maritime and trans-Saharan security systems to prevent illicit arms trafficking in the sub region.

The nine countries that have ratified the Convention, no doubt, want to ensure their internal safety and security but in the midst of seven other countries that do not see the importance of the Convention, the rest would soon realise that their action is tantamount to bolting their doors and leaving their windows ajar if they do not employ all available means to combat arms proliferation as they normally do in times of plague and locust invasion.

Civil society has a great role to play in this. They must continue to work by engaging Governments to popularize the Convention and ensure that its content is well appreciated by the citizenry. Ghana should not hoist its democratic credentials if it cannot work as a team with its neighbours for sub regional security.